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1 Introduction 
The measurement of individual welfare, using data on subjective well-being, has made great 
progress. This is reflected by a massive increase in the amount of scholarly work on people’s 
subjective well-being1 and ‘happiness research’ in the media. Our paper discusses this 
development with the background of public choice analysis. We argue that the possibility of 
adequately measuring individual well-being offers two avenues for productive cross-
fertilization of research on subjective well-being and public choice. First, direct measures of 
individual welfare offer a new way of confronting public choice hypotheses with field data. 
Second, insights from public choice help with assessing the new vision – be it explicit or 
implicit – of using subjective well-being measures to improve outcomes by using direct 
policy interventions to maximize some aggregate happiness measure as a social welfare 
function. Our discussion suggests that the latter is not a worthwhile approach to pursue; there 
are major objections to this approach from a public choice perspective. We present an 
alternative view of how the insights gained from happiness research may contribute to policy-
making. 
Section 2 sets the stage, outlining recent advances in the measurement of subjective well-
being and naming important advantages of these measures as indicators of individual welfare 
over the traditional indicators. In section 3, some illustrations are offered on how hypotheses 
of public choice theory can be confronted with evidence in a novel way using data on 
subjective well-being. The emphasis is on theories predicting rents in the public bureaucracy. 
Section 4 assesses happiness maximization from a public choice perspective. We first present 
the case in favor of happiness maximization. We then discuss it, using fundamental insights 
from social choice theory and add several incentive distortions induced by the happiness 
maximization approach. Section 5 outlines an alternative approach on how to use the insights 
of happiness research for policy from a constitutional point of view. Conclusions are drawn in 
section 6. 
                                                
1 For surveys on the study of happiness in economics, see Oswald (1997), Frey and Stutzer (2002a,b), 
van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004), Layard (2005), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006), Dolan et al. 
(2008) and Frey (2008). 
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2 Measuring Individual Welfare 
2.1 Conceptual Issues 
Happiness research has designed several indicators of subjective well-being, relying on 
different measurement techniques (for a discussion, see Kahneman et al. 1999; Diener 2005; 
Kahneman and Krueger 2006): global evaluations of individual life satisfaction, based on 
representative surveys; the Experience Sampling Method, which collects information on 
individuals’ actual experiences in real time in their natural environments; the Day 
Reconstruction Method, which asks people to reflect on how satisfied they felt at various 
times during the day; the U (“unpleasant”)-Index, which defines the fraction of time per day 
that an individual spends in an unpleasant state; and Brain Imaging, which uses functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to scan individual brain activity for correlates of positive 
and negative affect.  
There is now wide-spread consensus among scholars that these measures capture relevant 
information about people’s well-being. This is indicated by the fact that they correlate well 
with qualities and behaviors generally associated with happiness. Reliability studies have 
found that reported subjective well-being is moderately stable and sensitive to changing life 
circumstances (e.g. Ehrhardt et al. 2000; Schimmack and Oishi 2005). Consistency tests 
reveal that happy people smile more often during social interactions (Fernández-Dols and 
Ruiz-Belda 1995); are rated as happy by friends and family members (e.g. Sandvik et al. 
1993; Lepper 1998) and by spouses (Costa and McCrae 1988); express positive emotions 
more frequently, are more optimistic, are more sociable and extravert, and sleep better (Frank 
1997, Frey and Stutzer 2002b: 33). Happy people are also less likely to commit suicide 
(Koivumaa Honkanen et al. 2001; Helliwell 2007). 
Obviously, the various measures capture different aspects of individual well-being and thus 
different concepts of individual welfare. For a measure of reported subjective well-being to 
serve as a proxy for individual welfare, an important assumption is necessary: The standards 
underlying people’s judgments are those the individual would like to pursue in realizing his or 
her ideal of the good life. People’s judgments about their life can then serve as a proxy for 
their individual welfare. People are assumed to pursue individual welfare based on some 
stable evaluation standards. Moreover, the extent to which individual welfare is identified 
depends on whether the evaluation metric fits people’s judgments about their life. 
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The normative basis of this approach goes beyond assuming the pursuit of happiness, and also 
involves choosing the concrete evaluation metric to elicit people’s judgments.2 Thus, 
ambiguities remain when selecting the empirical concept in order to measure individual 
welfare (see Helliwell 2006, Kahneman and Riis 2005 and Kahneman et al. 2004a).  
Some people might favor a distant look reflecting on one’s life after the fact, while others 
favor the reasoned ex ante evaluations as their standards. Still others might give priority to 
how they felt when experiencing the course of life. 
Imagine those people who see happiness or high individual welfare as something like the 
“positive, persistent attitude towards both particular experiences and life experience more 
generally that a person feels upon repeated reflection” (Kelman 2005, p. 408f). For them, 
general evaluations of their satisfaction with life as a whole might be an appropriate metric to 
capture judgments about individual welfare. For those people who equate individual welfare 
with moment-to-moment affect, individual welfare might be best measured by such 
approaches as the experience sampling method (Scollon et al. 2003) or the day reconstruction 
method (Kahneman et al. 2004a). When looking for an empirical tool to collect information 
about people’s judgments, it is thus important to reveal the concrete metric. 
Most of the empirical work undertaken so far on happiness research in economics has been 
based on representative, large-scale sampling of individual global evaluations of life 
satisfaction. The great advantage of this measurement approach is its good performance 
compared to its cost, as well as its availability for a large number of countries and time 
periods. Thus, for example, the surveys on life satisfaction contained in the World Values 
Survey today cover 80 countries, and represent over 80 percent of the world’s population over 
4 periods of time. The Gallup World Poll even covers 132 countries and is nationally 
representative for individuals of 15 years of age and older (see Deaton 2008). For many tasks, 
self-reported measures of life satisfaction have proved to perform satisfactorily, especially for 
the issues economists are mostly interested in, namely the influence of economic factors on 
well-being. So far, we consider it the best empirical approximation to the concept of 
individual welfare used in economic theory that is widely available. In contrast, Experience 
Sampling and Brain Imaging are more costly and difficult to apply on a large scale. The Day 
                                                
2 An excellent account of the ambiguities of welfare in the context of economics and hedonic 
psychology is provided in Kelman (2005). 
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Reconstruction Method and the U-Index are new and, so far, have only been used empirically 
on an experimental basis.  
2.2 Advantages of Subjective Well-Being Indicators of Individual Welfare 
Focusing on reported subjective well-being rather than on individual income or Gross 
National Product per capita (or another measure of economic activity) as an indicator of 
individuals’ welfare has several important advantages over the traditional indicators. As they 
have been well documented (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2002a, chapter 2), it is sufficient to 
make brief comments on three major aspects. 
1. Measures of subjective well-being include non-material aspects of human well-being, 
such as the influence of social relations, autonomy, and self-determination. These are 
excluded, or inadequately included, in the traditional national accounts, and therewith in 
GNP. Aggregate happiness measures also go far beyond existing extensions of GNP (for a 
recent survey, see Michalos 2005), such as the “Measure of Economic Welfare” 
(Nordhaus and Tobin 1972), “Economic Aspects of Welfare” (Zolatas 1981), “Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare” (Daly and Cobb 1989) or “Human Development Index” 
(United Nations Development Programme 2005). These indicators exhibit a markedly 
different development over time than happiness indicators (see, e.g., Blanchflower and 
Oswald 2005, Leigh and Wolfers 2006). 
2. Measures of happiness consider outcome aspects of components already included in GNP 
via input measures. This holds, in particular, for the vast area of government activity 
(measured in GNP by the costs of material and labor). It is also directly relevant for 
(public) health and educational expenditures. “Social Indicators” (e.g. the "Index of Social 
Progress" by Estes 1988) mostly measure the input side, such as the number of hospital 
beds and doctors, or the number of class-rooms and teachers. 
3. Measures of happiness look at subjectively evaluated outcomes in line with the basic 
methodological approach of economics. In contrast, the capabilities approach and the 
“Human Development Index” of the United Nations look at objectively observable 
functionings (Sen 1985; 1999; Nussbaum 2000). 
4. Measures of happiness are able to capture both outcome and procedural utility (this will 
be discussed in section 4.3). 
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3 Confronting Public Choice Theories with Evidence 
Recent developments in research on subjective well-being in principle allow us to directly 
analyze the effects of government behavior on (proxy measures of) individual welfare. This 
offers a new way of assessing phenomena like the rise of the regulatory state (e.g. Glaeser and 
Shleifer 2003). It becomes possible to empirically explore whether different sets of 
regulations can be better explained by theories of optimal regulations or by public choice 
theories, for instance, on lobbying by special interest groups. Many public choice hypotheses 
predict that government activity tends towards redistribution favoring special interests, and 
tends to disregard measures improving the overall allocation of private and public resources. 
These hypotheses can be “directly” challenged with evidence. Based on a proxy measure for 
individual welfare, “net” effects of different institutions and policies for groups of people can 
be assessed.  
The study of reported subjective well-being also allows us to derive information about voters’ 
preferences in a new way, and to analyze basic assumptions of public choice models. For 
example, it is possible to explore whether left- and right-wing voters care differently about 
unemployment and inflation as underlying partisan business cycle models. 
3.1 Partisan Preferences Over Inflation and Unemployment 
Two basic interrelationships in politico-economic models about the interaction between 
policy makers and voters involve the macro economic measures of unemployment and 
inflation. On the one hand, voters are hypothesized to make the incumbent government 
responsible for the state of the economy and support it if unemployment and inflation are low, 
but vote for the opposition if the economic record of the government is bad. This mechanism 
has been analyzed in a number of empirical studies on popularity and election functions (see, 
e.g., Nannestad and Paldam 1994, Feld and Kirchgaessner 2000). On the other hand, in 
reaction to the economic voting of the citizens, politicians are hypothesized to influence 
economic performance in order to be reelected. This mechanism is at the core of research on 
political business cycles (see, e.g., Frey 1997).  
The underlying presumption in both relationships is that voters’ welfare is affected by the 
state of the economy (or at least that unemployment and inflation are signals about the quality 
of policy makers that ultimately determine people’s well-being). Moreover, competing 
models of political business cycles either assume opportunistic parties that simply want to 
please the median voter with their (macro) economic policy in order to secure reelection (e.g. 
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Nordhaus 1975), or start from the presumption that parties pursue an ideology and only serve 
their clientele if reelection is tight (e.g. Frey and Schneider 1978). The latter models assume 
that left- and right-wing voters are differently affected by economic performance in a 
systematic way. 
These core assumptions are difficult to study based on observed voting behavior alone. 
However, information about people’s subjective well-being allows us to assess these 
assumptions directly. It is found that unemployment first reduces the individual well-being of 
those personally affected. Being unemployed has psychic costs over and above the potential 
drop in the material living standard (for a review, see Frey and Stutzer 2002, chapter 5). 
Moreover, high unemployment rates also have non-negligible effects on people who are not 
personally affected by unemployment. Based on survey data from population samples of 
European Union member countries between 1975 and 1992, Di Tella et al. (2003) show that 
aggregate unemployment decreases average reported life satisfaction, even if personal 
unemployment is kept constant. The cumulative costs of unemployment are substantial. 
According to their estimation, the average person in the working population would have to be 
compensated with approximately $200 to offset the loss in life satisfaction caused by a typical 
U.S.-size recession (that is, a recession that entails a 1.5 percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate). A related study uses individual panel data for West Germany between 
1984 and 2004, and exploits fluctuations in regional unemployment rates that range from 
around 4 percent to almost 20 percent (Luechinger et al. 2008b). It is found that regional 
unemployment substantially reduces workers’ reported life satisfaction, whereby people 
working in the private sector are more affected by general economic shocks than people 
working in the public sector. When regional unemployment rises from the lowest amount 
(Baden-Wuerttemberg) to the highest amount (West Berlin in 2003) in the sample, the life 
satisfaction of employees in the private sector is reduced by 0.56 points (on a scale between 0 
and 10). In comparison, the negative effect on public sector employees is about a third lower 
than for private sector employees. Interestingly, for public servants, no negative correlation 
whatsoever is found between regional unemployment and reported life satisfaction. We are 
not aware of politico-economic models that take into account the differential exposure of 
voters to (macro) economic shocks. 
Inflation is the second important macro economic variable assumed to affect the welfare of 
voters. Based on the study by Di Tella et al. (2003) mentioned above, an increase in the 
inflation rate by one percentage point – say from the mean rate of 8 to 9 percent per year - is 
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calculated to reduce average happiness by 0.01 “units” of satisfaction, i.e. from an average 
level in the sample of 3.02 to 3.01. (Average satisfaction is calculated from a cardinal 
interpretation of the 4-item scale that attributes “not at all satisfied” a value of 1, “not very 
satisfied” a value of 2 etc.) Correspondingly, an increase in the inflation rate by 5 percentage 
points (which is historically quite likely) reduces subjective well-being by 5 percentage 
points. This is a substantial effect. It means that 5 percent of the population is shifted 
downwards from one life satisfaction category to the next lower one, e.g. from being ”not 
very satisfied” to “not at all satisfied”. 
In order to discriminate between models of political business cycles that are either based on 
opportunistic policy makers (following Nordhaus 1975) or on policy makers with partisan 
motivation (following Hibbs 1977), the above evidence is not sufficient. Tests need to be 
done to show whether left- and right-wing voters are differently affected by (macro) 
economic shocks. In a follow-up study, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) analyze whether 
differential effects are present in their sample of ten European countries between 1975 and 
2002. In the basic estimation, it is found that the probability of left-wing individuals reporting 
high life satisfaction falls by 13.4 percentage points (from 75.1% to 61.7%) if the rate of 
unemployment increases by ten percentage points. For right-wing individuals, the respective 
effect is smaller, namely 5.6 percentage points. A reverse order for the magnitude of the effect 
of inflation on life satisfaction is found. Left-wing individuals are estimated to report a 2.9 
percentage points lower probability of high life satisfaction if the price level were to increase 
by 10%, while the respective estimate for right-wing individuals is -7.2 percentage points. 
The empirical findings thus support the underlying assumption of partisan models of political 
business cycles. 
3.2 Government Activity 
Theories in public choice help us to understand and analyze why and to what extent 
government activity is not in line with citizens’ preferences. Rather than assuming an 
omniscient and benevolent government, informational shortcomings and private interests of 
legislators and executives are taken into account. There are, for example, a number of public 
choice hypotheses on why government size is “too big” according to citizens’ preferences. 
These theories emphasize the role of interest groups, the bureaucracy, fiscal illusion or the 
common pool problems in the cabinet in the growth of government (see, e.g., Mueller 2003). 
There are, however, also public choice considerations that there is “too little” government 
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activity according to the preferences of the population, e.g. if public expenditure (in particular 
transfers) is kept to a minimum by the ruling elite. 
There are a variety of ways in which deviations of public policy from the preferences of the 
population can be indirectly traced and empirically studied. Disappointment with government 
activity might be reflected in lower tax morale and tax evasion (e.g. Torgler 2007), retreat into 
the shadow economy (e.g. Enste and Schneider 2002) or even migration (Devereux and 
Weisbrod 2006).  
With proxy measures of individual welfare, it is in principal possible to directly study which 
people are positively or negatively affected by a particular government activity. The concrete 
empirical identification is, of course, a big challenge and faces all the well-known obstacles. 
A promising approach to empirically explore public choice hypotheses is to formulate them in 
a comparative institutional framework. Specific government institutions are then related to 
reports of people’s subjective well-being. This allows us, for example, to provide evidence on 
the consequences of direct versus representative democracy (Frey and Stutzer 2000), 
proportional versus majoritarian electoral systems, or different degrees of local autonomy 
(Frey and Stutzer 2000, Bjørnskov et al. 2008). Government outcomes, such as the level of 
expenditure or taxation, can be directly correlated with subjective well-being in order to 
identify whether government activity is in line with people’s preferences. According to many 
public choice theories, “big government” disregards people’s preferences. However, a large 
government sector might be closer to citizens’ preferred level of government activity exactly 
in those countries where people experience low subjective well-being, e.g. due to military, 
environmental or economic adversities. Identifying deviations from people’s preferences thus 
faces major problems. Nevertheless, two findings are worth mentioning. An aggregate cross-
section analysis for 74 countries shows a negative partial correlation between government 
consumption and reported life satisfaction (Bjørnskov et al. 2007). In contrast, a study based 
on repeated cross-section data for ten European OECD countries between 1975 and 1992 
finds a positive, but not statistically significant, relationship between government 
consumption as a percentage of GDP and life satisfaction (taking into account year and 
country dummies as well as country specific time trends) (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005). 
More specific analyses will be necessary to interpret these findings and to put the various 
public choice hypotheses on government activity to the test. 
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3.3 Bureaucratic Rents 
A specific group affected by government activity is public sector employees, whereby the 
monopoly position of the public bureaucracy in providing public services generates rents for 
them. In contrast to a model of benevolent bureaucracy, a public choice view predicts that 
bureaucrats will acquire those rents and protect them against dissipation.  
In order to understand the checks and balances that restrict the rent-seeking of government 
sector employees, direct measures of rents are desirable. A rent is understood as the utility 
premium of a worker in the government sector compared to an equally qualified worker in the 
private sector. Those rents can consist, for example, of wage differentials, monetary fringe 
benefits, non-monetary job amenities, and, in certain cases, the possibility of extracting 
bribes. Traditional approaches, based on wage differentials, either cannot capture all those 
benefits, or are not applicable, because they start from a competitive equilibrium where no 
rents exist. Job queues potentially capture total compensation, but proxy the rent only for the 
marginal position. Furthermore, if government jobs are allocated by cronyism, job queues 
provide no information on bureaucratic rents. Setting reported bureaucratic corruption equal 
to rents is not appropriate either, because it is not clear whether corruption leads to extra 
benefits for public employees, e.g. because there is the possibility of rent dissipation.  
Luechinger et al. (2008a) propose a direct measure to capture the rents involved in the 
government sector: the difference in reported subjective well-being between public 
bureaucrats and people working in the private sector of a country. If bureaucrats report higher 
life satisfaction, this differential is interpreted as a utility premium, or simply a rent.3 
Employees in the government sector are taken to benefit from a higher relative advantage or 
higher rents in countries where there is a larger positive gap in reported life satisfaction, 
                                                
3 This interpretation of relative life satisfaction differentials in single countries has to be taken with 
caution as people self-select into jobs given their preferences (e.g., for a less competitive and an 
economically more secure environment or for a job that is useful to society) and the institutional 
restrictions. This self-selection might lead to systematic biases. For example, better educated people 
are more likely to join the public administration in many countries. To the extent that they are more 
satisfied with life in general, they contribute to a positive raw differential in subjective well-being 
even though there might be no rent. In order to reduce any bias in the average effect of working in the 
public bureaucracy on life satisfaction, an instrumental variable approach would be necessary. 
However, the instrumental variable approach has proven to be very difficult to apply in the 
determination of public sector specific wage premiums (Gregory and Borland 1999, p. 3599). We thus 
resolve to control for differences in observed individual characteristics (like the level of education), as 
well as unobserved individual characteristics that are correlated with the former. This procedure is 
expected to reduce the bias in calculated differentials. 
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ceteris paribus. In contrast to previous approaches for measuring rents in the government 
sector, this approach has the advantage of measuring the total net utility differential between 
people working in the public and private sector. The proxy measure can be used to analyze 
the conditions determining the rents in public bureaucracy. It can be related to political and 
institutional factors that are argued to facilitate rent extraction, as well as to institutional 
constraints that are proposed as effective controls, guaranteeing efficiency in the government 
sector.  
In an exploratory study, the approach is applied to data on the life satisfaction of government 
and private sector employees from 21 European and 17 Latin American countries, based on 
the European Social Survey and the Latino Barometer respectively (Luechinger et al. 2008a). 
For each country, the relative well-being differential of an average worker is calculated when 
employed by the government rather than privately. This approach enables country specific 
response behavior to be taken into account. A large variation in the life satisfaction of 
government employees, relative to private employees, is found, ranging from a well-being 
premium for the former of plus 5 percent to a disadvantage of minus 3 percent.4 Relative 
advantages in life satisfaction in the public bureaucracy do not simply reflect differences in 
economic development. Rather, taking the level of per capita income into account, the proxy 
for rents in the public bureaucracy is higher when price controls and administrative obstacles 
hamper internal competition. Rents are also higher when regulatory trade barriers weaken 
external competition. In contrast, rents are lower in countries with an affordable independent 
judicial system and a long democratic track record. It is also shown that there is a sizeable 
positive correlation between the degree of corruption and the satisfaction gap in a country. 
The fact that rents positively correlate with corruption shows that the benefits acquired 
through corruption are neither completely dissipated nor do they compensate for potentially 
lower regular salaries in the government sector. 
                                                
4 While a negative differential looks peculiar at first sight, it could be explained by efficiency wages in 
the private sector. However, we consider two other arguments important to set the differentials in 
perspective. First, the restriction of the sample to working respondents leads to lower bound estimates 
of bureaucratic rents for two reasons: (i) former government sector employees usually enjoy 
exceptionally generous retirement provisions, and (ii) public officials are often protected from 
dismissal by special statutes. Second, more important than any bias in the general level of the life 
satisfaction differential would be distortions that affect the ranking of countries with regard to rents in 
the public bureaucracy. Such distortions would hamper the analysis of the institutional determinants of 
rents. It is found that the variation of the differentials across countries is robust to the control for 
selection based on observable characteristics. 
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These illustrations demonstrate that data on subjective well-being as proxy measures for 
individual welfare can be analyzed in a new way in order to confront public choice theories 
with evidence. 
4 Assessing the Maximization of Happiness from a Public Choice 
Perspective 
4.1 Arguments in Favor of Happiness Maximization 
The ordinalist revolution in economics, on which classical micro-economics is firmly based, 
takes it for granted that individual welfare can only be measured in an ordinal, but not in a 
cardinal way, and that it makes no sense to make interpersonal comparisons of utility. These 
are exactly the fundamental assumptions where the countermovement of happiness research 
sets in. Both cardinality and interpersonal comparability may be less of a problem on a 
practical level than on a theoretical level.5 For many applications, milder assumptions suffice. 
An important example is the valuation of public goods and public bads, based on the life 
satisfaction approach (see, e.g., Frey et al. 2009, van Praag and Baarsma 2004). Life 
satisfaction scores are reported on an ordinal scale. Using adequate statistical techniques, like 
ordered probit or ordered logit, the ordinal information is, however, sufficient to calculate a 
compensating surplus. Moreover, interpersonal comparability at the level of the individual is 
not a necessary condition for valuing public goods in the life satisfaction approach. It suffices 
if individual specific response frames do not systematically vary between different groups 
exposed to different levels of the public good, either across space or over time.6  
If the accumulated evidence is judged sufficient, in the sense that it allows for the cardinal 
measurement and interpersonal comparison of happiness, then it may be argued that one or 
more social welfare functions exist which can be used to derive policies to be pursued by 
democratic governments. One specific social welfare function is the unweighted sum of 
individual cardinal welfare or happiness. This function could be considered ‘democratic’ in 
the sense of attributing equal weight to each person. In contrast, the prices relevant for 
assessing the value of goods entering GNP are largely determined by the preferences of 
                                                
5 Interestingly enough, psychologists (who are very particular about measurements) seem to be more 
comfortable when comparing indicators of feelings or utility across individuals (Kahneman et al. 
2004b: 432). 
6 There are, of course, the standard problems of identification and the issue of hedonic adaptation that 
remain when valuing public goods based on the life satisfaction approach. 
   13 
people with high purchasing power. The preferences of individuals without any income to 
spend are disregarded. 
These steps towards aggregate happiness as a proxy measure for social welfare would fulfill 
an old dream in economics. Maximizing social welfare as the ultimate goal of economic 
policy dates back to Bentham (1789) and later to Edgeworth (1881), and was introduced into 
modern economics by Tinbergen (1956) and Theil (1964). This dream is closely linked with 
the attempt to turn economics into a natural science comparable to physics. Consistent with 
this view, Edgeworth uses the title “Mathematical Psychics” (1881) for his book.  
In the recent literature, the vision of aggregate happiness as a guideline for policy is well 
described by Layard in his influential book on “Happiness” (2005): 
“(…), there are many major choices where rules provide little guidance. There are public choices like 
how to treat criminals, or how to solve traffic problems. Simple appeals to principles of freedom or 
loving-kindness will help little here. (…) The answer can only be found from overarching objectives of 
maximizing human happiness” (p. 124, emphasis added) 
The progress made in measuring happiness also spurs traditional welfare economics on in 
other ways (see, e.g., Ng 2003). In particular, it enables optimal policies to be derived 
numerically in evaluation exercises for government policy.  
These developments seemingly support the idea of social welfare maximization, but we 
nevertheless argue in the following sections that, for a number of reasons, the presumed 
“socially optimal” values for the various determinants of happiness should not, and will not 
be used as policy goals to be pursued by democratic governments. In order to avoid any 
misunderstandings, we certainly do not argue that GNP should be maximized instead of 
happiness. Rather, we favor a different approach in order to use the valuable insights gained 
from happiness research. 
4.2 Social Choice Objections to Social Welfare Maximization 
Classical welfare economics, which was initially due to, and strongly influenced by, Robbins 
(1932) and Hicks and Allen (1934), has for a long time raised fundamental arguments against 
using the concept of aggregate social welfare in contrast to individual welfare. The two most 
important, and partially interconnected (see Sen 1970), objections to the concept of aggregate 
social welfare are (1) the impossibility of cardinal measurement and interpersonal 
comparisons of individual welfare, and (2) the impossibility theorem relating to aggregate or 
social welfare. 
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Based on the arguments and the evidence presented above, it may be concluded that, while 
the objections from classical welfare economics must be taken seriously, the existing state of 
research suggests that, for many purposes, reported subjective well-being is a satisfactory 
empirical approximation to individual welfare. 
However, the problem of aggregating individual preferences to a social welfare function 
under non-dictatorial conditions remains fundamental. Since Arrow (1951), it has been widely 
accepted that, given a number of “reasonable” conditions, no social welfare function exists 
that generally ranks individual orderings of outcomes (e.g. different distributions of well-
being scores) consistently, except a dictatorship. This impossibility result spawned a huge 
amount of literature (called ‘Social Choice’), analyzing its robustness to modifications of the 
assumptions. Theorem after theorem demonstrated that almost all changes in the axiomatic 
structure left the dictatorial result unchanged (see e.g. Sen 1970, 1995, Slesnick 1998). The 
conclusion has been drawn that “there is no way we can use empirical observations on their 
own to produce an ethically satisfactory cardinalization, let alone an ethically satisfactory 
social welfare ordering” (Hammond 1991: 220-21). Empirical observations are not sufficient 
to produce an acceptable social welfare function in a democracy. It is one of the essential 
points of our argument that additional aspects need to be considered. Thus, measuring 
individual welfare in terms of happiness is unable to solve aspects crucial for democratic 
economic policy.  
4.3 Objections from Political Economics to the Maximization of Aggregate Happiness 
The social welfare maximization approach disregards, and tries to substitute for, existing 
political institutions and processes. This is the “benevolent dictator” view castigated in 
Constitutional Political Economy (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Frey 1983, Brennan and 
Buchanan 1986, Mueller 1996, 2003 and Vanberg 2005). It applies to all kinds of efforts to 
derive a “socially optimal” policy from the above, i.e. by maximizing an aggregate goal 
function. In a democracy, there are constitutionally designed rules and institutions allowing 
citizens to reveal their preferences, and to provide politicians (the government) with an 
incentive to actualize them. As such, the maximization of a social welfare function is an 
intellectual exercise. Even if the government were to pay attention to the results, it has limited 
incentive to follow up on them. 
Citizens as metric stations 
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The social welfare maximizing approach, based on empirically estimated happiness functions, 
disregards the institutions on which democracy is based. Citizens are reduced to ‘metric 
stations’. They are forced into a state of passivity, which tends to increase their alienation 
from the state. In this respect, a happiness maximization approach is inimical to democracy. It 
disregards the interaction between citizens and politicians, the interest representation by 
organized groups and the concomitant information and learning processes. 
The latter argument refers to the fundamental direct interrelation between the approach 
applied to collective choices in a society and individual well-being. People have preferences 
for processes over and above outcomes. They gain well-being from living and acting under 
institutionalized processes, as they contribute to a positive sense of self, addressing innate 
needs of autonomy, relatedness and competence. We call this contribution to individual well-
being ‘procedural utility’. In the economy, individuals have been shown to enjoy procedural 
utility in their capacity as consumers or income earners; in the polity and society, as citizens 
subjected to different political and societal procedures; in organizations, as employees 
confronted with different organizational procedures; and in law, as litigants (for an 
introductory survey, see Frey et al. 2004, and for an application to democracy, see Frey and 
Stutzer 2005, Olken 2008). If people are reduced to “metric stations”, they experience a 
significant loss in autonomy, and therefore reduced (procedural) well-being, when dealing 
with public affairs.  
Happiness research also fails to provide a rule about the scope and limitations of government 
intervention in the private sphere. Should the government be allowed to prohibit the 
consumption of alcohol if this were to raise the population’s happiness in the long run, or 
should this be left to the discretion of individuals (based on the results of happiness research)? 
And even more importantly: To what extent should the government be allowed to change the 
preferences of its citizens? Many current interventions might affect people’s well-being in the 
future due to a change in preferences. Consider two extreme cases. Suppose that the 
government could adopt a policy of making people humble by reducing their material 
aspirations initially so that they are more appreciative of material benefits afterwards. Or, 
suppose that the government could raise a National Happiness Indicator by inducing people to 
take a “happiness pill”. Should such policies be accepted? This question cannot be answered 
within the happiness maximization calculus, but must be decided at a more fundamental level. 
A feasible and theoretically consistent approach is to resort to the constitutional level, where 
people make such fundamental decisions behind the veil of uncertainty (see section 5). 
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Probably the most fundamental issue is whether happiness is the ultimate goal to be 
maximized. Other valid goals, for instance, may be loyalty, responsibility, self-esteem, 
freedom or personal development. It is easy to imagine that a single mother with several 
children does not consider her emotional well-being to be of primary importance in her life. 
Responsibility may carry much more weight. Whether happiness is the ultimate goal of 
individuals, or whether it is only one of several goals, has been a controversial issue in 
philosophy for centuries. 
Playing the system 
So far, we have assumed that the decision to maximize social welfare in terms of aggregate 
(measured) happiness does not have any influence on the measurement of subjective well-
being. This assumption is highly debatable. Indeed, the political use of aggregate happiness 
would certainly induce strategic interactions between government and individuals. Two kinds 
of distortions need to be taken into account. 
Once aggregate happiness has become politically relevant, the government, public 
bureaucracy and various interest groups have an incentive to manipulate it. This has proved to 
be true for GNP and for other economic indicators declared to be goals of government 
activity. As the unemployment rate has become a politically important indicator, governments 
have started to influence it in order to paint a better picture of the state of the labor market 
than is actually the case. Thus, for instance, people who have been unemployed for a long 
time are no longer defined as being in the workforce so as to lower the official unemployment 
rate. It is also a well-known fact that the way of measuring budget deficits has been 
manipulated by some European countries when the rules for entering the European Monetary 
Union required that budget deficits did not exceed three percent of GDP and that public debt 
did not exceed sixty percent of GDP. Many EU member countries (most notably Greece and 
Italy) resorted to accounting tricks or “creative accounting”7 in order to meet these 
requirements, though in reality they clearly violated them (see, e.g., Forte 2001; von Hagen 
and Wolff 2004). Such distortions of indicators were so widespread that it was observed that 
“[...] the determining factor for achieving membership of the planned European Monetary 
Union (EMU) seems to rely on widespread use of public-sector creative accounting 
                                                
7 Creative accounting does not violate the law, but it is clearly against the spirit of the law and 
accounting standards. It uses the rules, the flexibility provided by them and the omissions within them, 
in order to make financial statements which look different from what is intended by the rule (Jameson 
1988). 
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measures” (Dafflon and Rossi 1999: 59-60). In the rare case that a government is unable to 
manipulate a particular indicator to its benefit, it has an incentive to create new indicators. 
This is easily possible in the case of happiness. As has been pointed out in the second section, 
a variety of indicators may capture individual well-being. Governments and pressure groups 
will choose those indicators most beneficial to their respective interests, or will create new 
ones better suited to their purposes (like, e.g., the “Happy Planet Index” (Marks et al. 2006)).  
A second systematic distortion stems from respondents’ incentives to misrepresent their well-
being. When individuals become aware that the happiness level they report influences the 
behavior of political actors, they have an incentive to misrepresent it. They can “play the 
system”.  
The two systematic distortions discussed represent a basic phenomenon, which even applies 
to the natural sciences. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle states that the observation of a 
system fundamentally disturbs it. In the social sciences, both the observation and public 
reporting can change the observed behavior of the people involved. This reaction is related to 
Goodhart’s Law and the Lucas Critique (see Chrystal and Mizen 2003).8 Goodhart’s Law 
(1975) states that any observed statistical relationship – such as the happiness function – will 
tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes. The Lucas Critique 
(1976) refers more specifically to econometric modeling: a different policy making behavior 
(such as using an aggregate happiness indicator) influences the expectations of private agents 
and this changes behavior in a rational-expectations model.  
5 A Constitutional View on Happiness Research 
The discussion so far has endeavored to show that the maximization of aggregate happiness as 
a social welfare function is a doubtful approach for several reasons. First, governments are not 
composed of purely benevolent politicians wanting to make the population as happy as 
possible. Rather, the personal interests of politicians are also a factor. Second, the essential 
elements of democratic governance are disregarded: democracy consists of interaction 
between politicians and citizens on many different levels, structured by the constitution and 
not simply recording the reported well-being of the citizens. Third, the government has an 
incentive to manipulate the happiness indicators and to create new ones to suit their goals. 
                                                
8 An important application is to the relationship between inflation and unemployment as captured in 
the Philips Curve. The functional relationship might cease to exist once monetary authorities attempt 
to exploit it. 
   18 
Fourth, the individuals have an incentive to misrepresent their happiness levels strategically in 
order to influence government policy in their favor. Fifth, some might also claim that 
problems of cardinality and interpersonal comparability can never be fully overcome. 
We argue that happiness research should not aim at constructing a social welfare function at 
all, but that the insights provided by happiness research should be used in a different way. Our 
vision rests on the fundamental presumption that the quality of the political process is a key 
factor to people’s happiness and that the legitimacy of political action finally rests on the 
voluntary agreement of the citizens involved. Individual sovereignty should not be reduced to 
self-reports on well-being. It should include choices on how to best pursue happiness, both 
individually and collectively. The claim is not for ‘naïve’ consumer or citizen sovereignty, 
which assumes optimal behavior. People, with their bounded rationality and bounded 
willpower, are sometimes aware of their own limitations (and sometimes only aware of the 
limitations of their fellow citizens). 
Accordingly, at the collective level, the political process should be institutionally structured 
so that people’s common interests become the principal driving force. Economic policy must 
help to establish those fundamental institutions, which make politicians and pubic bureaucrats 
most responsive to people’s common interests (dominating behind a veil of ignorance) and 
which finally lead to the best possible fulfillment of individual preferences. As argued above, 
happiness is not necessarily people’s ultimate goal. It may even be that people see some virtue 
in unhappiness if they reckon that discontent is the only way to overcome social ills.  
Happiness research has two different practical uses for policy: (1) It helps to identify which 
institutions enable individuals to best meet their preferences, and which therefore contribute 
most to their personal happiness; (2) It provides important informational inputs for the 
political process. 
(1) Happiness research provides insights on how, and to what extent, institutions have 
systematic effects on indicators of individual well-being (see also section 3.2). The 
emphasis is on institutions rather than specific policy interventions. To give an example, 
happiness policy should focus on the relationship between the fiscal constitution of a 
jurisdiction and people’s subjective well-being rather than on the optimal tax scheme in 
terms of happiness. The range of institutions under study includes self-binding 
mechanisms, social norms, private and public law (i.e. the rules of the game), as well as 
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constitutional conditions on how to choose rules. The latter, for example, involves the 
possibility of direct democratic decision making (Frey and Stutzer 2000). 
(2) The results gained from happiness research should be taken as informational inputs into 
the political process. These inputs have yet to prove themselves in political competition, 
in citizens’ discourse, and also in the discourse between citizens and politicians. 
Happiness research has already produced many insights, which can be introduced into the 
political discussion process. They include policy issues like, for example, the effect of 
mandatory retirement and mandatory schooling on happiness (Charles 2002; Oreopoulos 
2005); the consequences of social work norms, birth control rights and other women’s 
rights on women’s well-being (Lalive and Stutzer 2004; Pezzini 2005); the impact of 
tobacco taxes on smokers’ well-being (Gruber and Mullainathan 2005); or the relation 
between working time regulations and people’s subjective well-being (Alesina et al. 
2005). A competent overview of selected findings, with policy relevance, is provided by 
Diener and Seligman (2004). 
The proposed constitutional vision takes into account that there is a demand for happiness 
research in the current politico-economic process. For example, parties in competition will 
want to learn about voters’ preferences from data on reported subjective well-being. This 
demand for analyses might include evaluations of specific policy issues as well as grand 
policy schemes. Or, the public administration involved in valuing public goods will use the 
life satisfaction approach (for an application, see, e.g. Frey et al. 2009) in order to get 
complementary information for cost-benefit analyses. 
6 Conclusion 
Happiness research and public choice can both benefit from taking each other’s key insights 
into account. Improvements in the measurement of individual welfare allow us to confront 
public choice hypotheses in a new way with empirical evidence. This has been illustrated for 
basic assumptions on the partisan model of political business cycles, theories of government 
size and rents in the public bureaucracy.  
The huge progress in the measurement of individual welfare makes it tempting to pursue the 
old dream of maximizing aggregate happiness as a social welfare function. Improvements in 
individual welfare are claimed to be directly measurable, and politics is seen as following 
advice and implementing it with suitable interventions in the political process.  
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Based on public choice analysis, we argue that the appropriate approach is not to maximize 
aggregate happiness directly by seeking to improve outcomes through direct interventions. 
Rather, we see the role of happiness research as seeking to improve the nature of the political 
processes. Individuals should have more opportunity of advancing what constitutes their idea 
of the good life, both individually and collectively. They should be made aware that different 
issues require different measures and indicators of well-being. Happiness research should 
remain open to constructing a number of different indicators, reflecting well-being according 
to different aspects of life. Plurality is a necessary consequence of the procedural view 
outlined. This is in stark contrast to the maximization approach requiring one single objective. 
From a constitutional standpoint, we conclude that people are best served with comparative 
institutional analyses on subjective well-being. 
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